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Abstract
Background: Social distancing interventions such as school closure and prohibition of public
gatherings are present in pandemic influenza preparedness plans. Predicting the effectiveness of
intervention strategies in a pandemic is difficult. In the absence of other evidence, computer
simulation can be used to help policy makers plan for a potential future influenza pandemic. We
conducted simulations of a small community to determine the magnitude and timing of activation
that would be necessary for social distancing interventions to arrest a future pandemic.
Methods: We used a detailed, individual-based model of a real community with a population of
approximately 30,000. We simulated the effect of four social distancing interventions: school
closure, increased isolation of symptomatic individuals in their household, workplace
nonattendance, and reduction of contact in the wider community. We simulated each of the
intervention measures in isolation and in several combinations; and examined the effect of delays
in the activation of interventions on the final and daily attack rates.
Results: For an epidemic with an R0 value of 1.5, a combination of all four social distancing
measures could reduce the final attack rate from 33% to below 10% if introduced within 6 weeks
from the introduction of the first case. In contrast, for an R0 of 2.5 these measures must be
introduced within 2 weeks of the first case to achieve a similar reduction; delays of 2, 3 and 4 weeks
resulted in final attack rates of 7%, 21% and 45% respectively. For an R0 of 3.5 the combination of
all four measures could reduce the final attack rate from 73% to 16%, but only if introduced without
delay; delays of 1, 2 or 3 weeks resulted in final attack rates of 19%, 35% or 63% respectively. For
the higher R0 values no single measure has a significant impact on attack rates.
Conclusion: Our results suggest a critical role of social distancing in the potential control of a
future pandemic and indicate that such interventions are capable of arresting influenza epidemic
development, but only if they are used in combination, activated without delay and maintained for
a relatively long period.
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Concern exists that the avian H5N1 influenza virus may
become readily transmissible between humans, leading to
a pandemic with significant mortality [1].
Social distancing interventions, such as school closure,
reducing workplace numbers, reducing social and com-
munity contacts, and increasing home isolation are
embedded within the pandemic influenza preparedness
plans of most countries [2-4] and appear in current WHO
recommendations. Social distancing interventions are
important as they represent the only type of intervention
measure guaranteed to be available against a novel strain
of influenza in the early phases of a pandemic. The goal of
these interventions is to reduce the overall illness attack
rates and the consequential excess mortality attributed to
the pandemic, and to delay and reduce the peak attack
rate, reducing pressure on health services and allowing
time to distribute and administer antiviral drugs and, pos-
sibly, suitable vaccines.
Modelling [5] has suggested that early interventions
which increase social distancing may postpone the time to
reach peak attack rates and limit the total number of cases
and deaths attributed to pandemic influenza. This theo-
retical work has recently been supported by archival stud-
ies of excess deaths attributed to the 1918–19 pandemic
in the largest US cities [6] and by the work of [7] for an
Australian city. While these studies show that the histori-
cally implemented measures were not effective in prevent-
ing any local epidemics, they do show a strong correlation
between the delay in introduction of intervention meas-
ures and excess mortality (both total and peak).
However, the potential impact and possible limitations of
social distancing measures are not fully understood. An
evaluation of the evidence base for non-pharmaceutical
interventions concluded that there is a general lack of sci-
entific evidence or expert consensus for school closure,
workplace closure or banning of public gatherings during
a pandemic [8].
Epidemiological simulation models have been used to
analyse the effects of alternative containment measures.
Various studies have simulated influenza pandemics at
the scale of the whole world [9], whole countries [10-13],
and individual communities [14,15]. A picture that
emerges from a comparison of such simulation studies is
that the predicted efficacy of social distancing interven-
tion measures can depend strongly on the particular
assumptions made about the operation of each interven-
tion [15]. For example, little can be predicted about the
outcome of school closure without specifying the contact
behaviour of students when schools are closed, the timing
of introduction of closure, or the other intervention meas-
ures that are concurrently in effect.
The purpose of this study was to extend the scope of sim-
ulations of social distancing interventions in an influenza
pandemic by examining several important assumptions
which have been not previously studied in a systematic
way. We present results from an examination of the tim-
ing-of-activation and combination of social distancing inter-
ventions to determine how these factors impact their
effectiveness, and thus to inform policy decisions regard-
ing reactive strategies for mitigating the effects of an influ-
enza pandemic.
Methods
In previous work, we constructed a detailed, individual-
based model of a real community in the south west of
Western Australia (Albany) with a population of approxi-
mately 30,000, and applied the model to conduct simula-
tions of the spread of pandemic influenza – full details of
the model can be found in [15].
We used census data and state and local government data
to construct a population of virtual individuals and
households that matched the age and household structure
of the real town. Individuals were also grouped into a
number of "contact hubs" such as schools, child care facil-
ities, adult educational facilities, workplaces and the
regional hospital. Additional random contact in the com-
munity was modelled, with contacts biased towards meet-
ings between individuals with nearby household
locations.
Each simulation proceeded in a sequence of 12-hour
cycles. During each cycle, a nominal location of each indi-
vidual was calculated; taking into account the type of cycle
(day or night, weekend or weekday), the contact hub the
individual was a member of (if any), and the infection sta-
tus of the individual and so forth. Individuals occupying
the same household or contact hub during the same cycle
were deemed to come into potentially infectious contact.
When a susceptible and infectious individual came into
contact, a probability of infection transmission was calcu-
lated, based on the underlying infectivity of the viral
strain, the age of the susceptible individual, and the
progress and severity of the infection of the infectious
individual. Influenza infection was assumed to proceed
for 6 days, with 1 day latent, 1 day asymptomatic and
infectious, followed by 4 days infectious (either sympto-
matic or asymptomatic). Although there is little evidence
for spread from asymptomatic subjects for pandemic
influenza, we adopted the conservative assumption that
the proportion of individuals experiencing asymptomatic
infection matched that of seasonal influenza.Page 2 of 10
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select the various model parameter values can be found in
[15], and the resulting parameter value settings are
recorded in Supporting Information Text S1 of that publi-
cation. Since the infectivity of an epidemic arising from a
new strain of influenza is uncertain, we simulated epi-
demics with basic reproduction numbers (R0) of 1.5, 2.5
and 3.5, which, assuming no intervention, gave final
symptomatic attack rates of 33%, 65% and 73% respec-
tively. Characteristics of these baseline epidemics are
given in Table 1.
For the study described in this paper we extended that
model to allow delayed introduction of social distancing
intervention measures, and conducted a new simulation
experiment series. We simulated four different social dis-
tancing intervention measures. For each measure (and for
several combinations of simultaneously applied meas-
ures), we simulated the effect of introducing each inter-
vention measure (and several combinations of
simultaneously applied measures) at different points in
time, ranging from 0 to 8 weeks after the introduction of
the first infectious case into the community. Once intro-
duced, it was assumed that interventions continued until
the end of the simulation.
The four intervention measures simulated were as follows:
School closure
We assumed that when schools were closed, students and
teachers spent weekday daytime cycles at home rather
than at school. This meant that no contact took place at
that school, but that these individuals would contact any
other individuals present in their household during the
day. We also assumed that if school closure would result
in a child being present in a household alone, one adult
from the household stayed home (and did not make hub
contacts).
Increased case isolation
When the increased case isolation intervention was in
effect, there was a 90% (100% for children) chance that,
upon become symptomatic, an adult (or child) would
withdraw to their household for the duration of their
infection (in the no-intervention case these probabilities
were 50% for adults and 90% for children). We assumed
that withdrawn individuals made only household con-
tacts thereafter.
Workplace non-attendance
When this measure was in effect, each person attending a
workplace had a 50% chance each day of staying home
instead of attending the workplace. Individuals staying at
home made contacted all other individuals at home dur-
ing the day.
Community contact reduction
When this measure was in effect, individuals made half as
many community contacts with other individuals per day.
Results
Impact of intervention activation delay on epidemic 
attack rates
We use a final symptomatic attack rate of < 10% as a crite-
rion for determining that an epidemic due to a novel pan-
demic strain of influenza has been prevented. For an
epidemic with an R0 value of 1.5, we found that the only
single intervention measure capable of preventing an epi-
demic was the 90% case isolation measure, and only if
applied within 3 weeks. We found that a combination of
all four social distancing measures could reduce the final
attack rate from 33% to 9% if introduced within 6 weeks
from the introduction of the index case. If applied pre-
emptively, anticipating the arrival of the index case into
the otherwise uninfected community, this combination of
measures reduces the total attack rate to 1.6%, with a cor-
respondingly significant reduction in attendant mortality
rates. Figure 1 shows the relationship between final attack
Table 1: Characteristics of baseline epidemics
Characteristic R0
1.5 2.5 3.5
Mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D
Final infection rate (%) 39.7 1.47 79.7 0.52 91.2 0.24
Final attack rate (%) 33.3 1.2 64.8 0.41 73.2 0.29
Peak symptomatic population (%) 4.8 0.41 25.7 0.55 43.0 0.71
Peak daily attack rate (per 10,000) 87 8 481 21 856 32
Peak attack day 57 5.6 29 2.0 20. 1.7
Serial interval 2.97 0.01 2.74 0.01 2.45 0.01
This table gives characteristics of simulated baseline epidemics (that is, epidemics where no intervention measures were applied) with R0 values of 
1.5, 2.5 and 3.5. The mean and standard deviation (S.D.) are for 40 independent randomly seeded simulation runes.Page 3 of 10
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ure on its own and the combination of all measures.
In contrast, for an epidemic with an R0 value of 2.5 the
combination of all intervention measures must be intro-
duced within 2 weeks of the index case to prevent an epi-
demic developing; delays of 2, 3 and 4 weeks resulted in
final attack rates of 7%, 21% and 45% respectively (see
Figure 1). No single intervention measure could reduce
the final attack rate to less than 48%, even if activated pre-
emptively. While not controlling the epidemic, the com-
bination of school closure plus 90% case isolation
approximately halved the final attack rate (from 65% to
31%), illustrating the value of layering multiple interven-
tion measures, especially for high values of R0.
For an epidemic with an R0 of 3.5, perhaps considered to
be a worst-case scenario, our results indicate that the com-
bination of all interventions was unable to reduce the
final illness attack rate to less than 10% and unable to pre-
vent an epidemic occurring. However, the rapid activation
of measures may significantly arrest epidemic develop-
ment, giving final attack rates of 16%, 19% and 35% if
activated pre-emptively or with a 1 or 2 week delay,
respectively.
We found a similar effect of intervention delay on peak
daily attack rates (see Figure 2). For an epidemic with an
R0 of 1.5, any of the intervention measures except 50%
workplace non-attendance reduced the peak daily attack
rate from 90 cases per 10,000 to below 35 if introduced
within 4 weeks. For an R0 of 2.5, only the combination of
all measures applied within 2 weeks could reduce the peak
daily attack rate from 474 to below 35 cases per 10,000.
Delays of 2, 3 or 4 weeks resulted in peak daily attack rates
of 28, 151 or 422 cases per 10,000 respectively. To put this
Relationship between intervention activation delay and final illness attack ratesFigure 1
Relationship between intervention activation delay and final illness attack rates. Results for five different interven-
tion strategies are shown for R0 = 1.5 (blue); four strategies are shown for R0 = 2.5 (orange); two strategies are shown for R0 
= 3.5. All data points are averages of 40 randomly seeded simulation runs; standard deviation each 40-run set was < 1.4% of the 
population.Page 4 of 10
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pitalisation [16], delays of 2, 3 or 4 weeks would require
the 120-bed regional hospital in the 30,000 person com-
munity to handle 0.84, 4.5 or 12.7 influenza admissions
per day at the peak of the epidemic, respectively. For an
epidemic with an R0 of 3.5, the situation is even more
stark: the combination of all measures applied within one
week reduced the peak daily attack rate from 856 to 33;
delays of 2 or 3 weeks resulted in peak daily attack rates of
187 or 801 cases per 10,000 respectively. Figure 2 shows
the relationship between peak daily attack rates and inter-
vention measure activation delay.
In order to illustrate the effect of delays in activation of
intervention measures on the time course of an epidemic,
Figure 3 shows cumulative and daily attack rate epidemic
curves for school closure, for delays of between 2 and 8
weeks. The figure clearly shows the contrast between epi-
demics with R0 values of 1.5 and 2.5. In the former case
the rate of infection peaks on day 58; pre-emptive school
closure is capable of making large reductions in final and
peak daily attack rates, and each additional delay of 2
weeks steadily reduces the effectiveness of the interven-
tion. In the latter case the epidemic peaks on day 28;
school closure does not make a large reduction in final
attack rate even if applied pre-emptively, and reduction in
peak daily attack rate declines suddenly between delays of
2 and 4 weeks.
Relationship between intervention delay and observed 
case trigger thresholds
We have examined the effect of delaying intervention in
terms of the time between the first infected individual
appearing in the population and the activation of inter-
vention measures. In reality, it is unlikely that the first case
of pandemic influenza in a community would be identi-
Relationship between intervention activation delay and peak daily illness attack rates for various intervention strategiesFigure 2
Relationship between intervention activation delay and peak daily illness attack rates for various intervention 
strategies. Results for R0 = 1.5 (blue), R0 = 2.5 (orange), and R0 = 3.5 (red) are shown.Page 5 of 10
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Epidemic curves for school closure for a range of activation delaysFigure 3
Epidemic curves for school closure for a range of activation delays. Cumulative (top) and peak daily (bottom) attack 
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BMC Public Health 2009, 9:117 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/117fied in a timely fashion. One observable measure of epi-
demic progress used in public heath planning is the
proportion of the population known to have been
infected, as estimated by the number of reported cases.
Table 2 relates the number of observed cases to a corre-
sponding activation delay for a range of intervention trig-
ger thresholds, assuming that only 50% of symptomatic
cases are reported.
Impact of interventions on age-specific attack rates
Our results showed that the simulated intervention meas-
ures affected age groups differentially. The interventions
that caused the largest deviation from the baseline age-
specific attack rate profile were school closure, which
caused a larger proportional reduction in the attack rate of
the school age range (6–17 years) compared to other age
groups; and workplace nonattendance, which resulted in
a proportionally larger reducing the attack rate of the 18–
64 age group. The age-specific attack rates for the baseline
epidemic (which was calibrated to resemble that of sea-
sonal influenza), and epidemics mitigated by each of the
four intervention measures are shown in Figure 4. It is
interesting to note that the 50% workplace nonattendance
measure and the school closure measure directly target
approximately the same sized sub-population each day:
half of the 18–64 age group, or 29%; compared to all of
the 0–17 age group, or 28% (Figure 5 shows that age struc-
ture of the simulated population). Despite this fact,
school closure has the greater effect, showing that in our
model school children are disproportionally responsible
for transmitting infection.
Discussion
We consider social distancing interventions for a number
of reasons; to better understand the effect which individ-
ual social distancing measures have on the attack rate and
consequential mortality rate; to determine their sensitivity
to the time of activation; to address scenarios where sup-
plies of antiviral drugs and suitable vaccines are in limited
supply, either due to an outbreak occurring in a country
with little access to these resources drugs, due to logistical
delays in their distribution and administration or due to
the unavailability of an appropriately "typed" vaccine,
particularly at the early states of a pandemic.
Antiviral drugs and social distancing interventions share
several common characteristics: neither confers long-last-
ing immunity, and both deplete limited resources once in
operation (a drug stockpile on one hand, and public
patience on the other). The use of antiviral drugs is a core
feature of the pandemic preparedness plans of many
countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Australia [4,3,2]. Their use in an influenza pandemic
is however an untested strategy: more experience is
needed to determine their likely effectiveness and optimal
use, especially given the possibility of the development of
antiviral drug resistance during or prior to a pandemic
[17-19]. It therefore seems prudent to consider social dis-
tancing interventions as an alternative or complement to
antiviral-based strategies.
Social distancing interventions are important as they rep-
resent the only type of intervention measure guaranteed
to be available against a novel strain of influenza in the
early phases of a pandemic. They may be readily activated
and thought of as a first line of defence in developing and
developed countries alike. For the purposes of our study
we have assumed that once intervention measures have
been activated they continued indefinitely. The final
attack rates reported thus represent ideal scenarios: pre-
liminary results of additional research indicate that inter-
ventions would need to continue for approximately 5
months to prevent an epidemic with an R0 of 2.5, which is
clearly unrealistic. While long-term imposition of socially
and economically disruptive measures is not possible,
social distancing interventions may be used to buy time
for the establishment of an antiviral containment pro-
gramme and/or the distribution of a vaccine [4,3,2].
The historical record indicates that social distancing meas-
ures may be implemented, relaxed and sometimes re-
Table 2: Diagnosed case thresholds and intervention trigger 
timings
Threshold Cases R0
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.5
Delay until threshold reached (days)
0.05% 15 9 7 6 5
0.1% 30 13 9 8 6
0.5% 150 24 16 13 10
1.0% 300 30 19 15 11
2.0% 600 37 23 18 13
4.0% 1200 46 27 21 15
8.0% 2400 58 32 24 17
This table shows a range of case count trigger thresholds and the 
consequent delay in intervention corresponding to each threshold. 
The boldface delays are those for which the final illness attack rate is 
< 10%, if all four intervention measures are activated at that time and 
continued indefinitely.
For a case to count towards the intervention threshold it is assumed 
that the following sequence of events occurs:
a) The individual becomes infected.
b) The individual experiences symptomatic infection.
c) They present to a health care professional in a monitoring scheme.
d) The infection is correctly diagnosed as pandemic influenza.
e) The case is reported to the monitoring scheme.
We assume a 50% ascertainment efficiency, which is the conditional 
probability that e) occurs, given that both a) and b) have occurred. 
We assume that there are no false-positive reports of pandemic 
influenza.Page 7 of 10
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the optimal timing for rescinding and re-implementing
social distancing interventions [21]. However our results
show what may be expected of social distancing interven-
tions when implemented early and maintained indefi-
nitely (or in practical terms, until an effective vaccination
programme has been completed); and we establish maxi-
mum activation delays allowable if such interventions are
to fulfil their potential.
The results are applicable to industrialised populations
and are possibly not applicable to developing countries
having lower population mobility and/or higher popula-
tion densities. In such countries we may find higher daily
contact rates and hence reduced opportunities for limiting
contact and in achieving isolation in the household by
non-pharmaceutical means.
When comparing our results to those of other models, dif-
ferences arise which may be due to alternative assump-
tions being made regarding the demographics and contact
behaviour of the population, and to different assump-
tions regarding interventions and the methods for deploy-
ing them. However, we are able to comment at a general
level on how our results relate to that of methodologically
similar studies.
The work of Glass et al [5] most closely resembles that of
ourselves, whereby they utilise a population of 10,000
individuals and, like us, examine only non-pharmaceuti-
cal interventions. Their model represents the estimated
structure and contact patterns of a synthetic town in the
USA; it is unclear to us how the differences in the detail
modelled, between an actual population (Albany, Aus-
tralia in our case) and this synthetic town affect the qual-
ity of the results obtained. The results coincide well for an
R0 of 1.5 to 1.6, when considering school closure as the
only intervention. With an R0 of 2.5 and all non-pharma-
ceutical interventions activated together, the results in [5]
suggest a reduction in the illness attack rate in the range
Age-specific attack rates for social distancing interventionsFigure 4
Age-specific attack rates for social distancing interventions. Final attack rates are shown for each of 7 age groups for a 
baseline (unmitigated) epidemic, and for epidemics mitigated by 4 intervention measures. An R0 value of 1.5 is assumed; inter-
ventions are assumed to be applied pre-emptively.Page 8 of 10
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terns assumed. By contrast, the results presented here sug-
gest that an attack rate of as low as 3% may result if all
interventions are activated optimally, that is within the
first week of the arrival of an outbreak-producing index
case and held indefinitely. One difference which may
explain this variance is that Glass et al assume a threshold
of 10 diagnosed cases in a school before closure is effected
compared with the optimal strategy adopted by ourselves.
This again highlights the significance of rapid interven-
tion if we are to prevent an epidemic, or to substantially
reduce its rate of growth.
In comparing whole-country models such as that pro-
duced for the USA by Germann et al [13], the only control
interventions which can be directly compared is that of
school closure in isolation. The simulated attack rate for
unmitigated epidemics with R0 = 1.5/1.6 are reduced to
1% and 13%, comparing the Germann et al result with
that presented here. What is perhaps more interesting is
that for R0's in the range 1.9 to 2.4 significant reductions
in attack rates to a level where an epidemic may be pre-
vented are only achieved by Germann et al by combining
non-pharmaceutical interventions with either targeted
antiviral prophylaxis or vaccination, with the exception of
child-first vaccination for an R0 of 1.9. Our results suggest
that for R0's up to and including 2.5 epidemics may be
prevented by combined non-pharmaceutical interven-
tions alone, provided they are activated immediately and
are sustained indefinitely. Given the logistics of vaccina-
tion and antiviral drug deployment it is highly likely that
non-pharmaceutical interventions may be activated more
rapidly and our results suggest a similar ability to prevent
epidemic development as that achieved by a combined
pharmaceutical/non-pharmaceutical strategy.
The need to react rapidly when activating interventions is
also highlighted by Ferguson et al [12] where antiviral
treatment is very sensitive to initial delays of 24 hours,
due to the use of an early, peaked infectiousness function.
This contrasts with our more abstract flat infectivity pro-
file. Single non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as
school closure or home quarantine, are shown to have lit-
tle impact for R0 in the range 1.7 – 2.0, whilst more signif-
icant reductions are suggested in the results that we derive.
Similarly, school closure and 50% workplace reduction
has less effect (an approximately 4 percentage point
reduction in attack rate) in the Ferguson et al model com-
pared to our results, where the suggested reduction in
attack rate is of the order of 20 percentage points. While
there are clear differences in assumptions between the two
models and direct comparison is difficult, key factors may
be their requirement to diagnose one case in a school
before closure is effected, and their assumption that addi-
tional community contact occurs when schools are closed.
The range of modelling estimates for the potential effec-
tiveness of social distancing interventions such as school
closure is considerable, and may stem from the range of
modelling assumptions about the operation of school clo-
sure and associated behavioural changes of individuals
[15]. Observations of actual school closures do not seem
to provide conclusive evidence on the effectiveness of
school closure. Based on observations made during a
teacher's strike in Israel, it was estimated by Heymann et
al [22] that diagnoses of respiratory infections decreased
by 42%. In contrast Cowling et al [23] observed that a
school closure episode in Hong Kong in 2008 had little
impact on influenza attack rates – although in that case
school closure appears to have occurred after the epidemic
peak. The largest scale study known to the authors that
provides an estimate of the effectiveness of school closure
on influenza epidemics is the work of Cauchemez et al
[24]. Based on surveys of seasonal influenza during and
between school terms in France, this work estimated that
school closure could achieve at most a 17% reduction in
attack rates, indicating that school closure may not be as
effective as predicted our model.
Conclusion
Our results suggest a critical role of combined social dis-
tancing measures in the potential control of a future pan-
demic. They indicate that non-pharmaceutical social
distancing interventions are capable of preventing influ-
enza epidemics with R0 values of up to 2.5, and of signifi-
cantly reducing the rate of development and overall
burden of epidemics with R0 values of up to 3.5, but only
if used in combination, activated without delay, and
Age structure of simulated populationFigure 5
Age structure of simulated population. The percentage 
of the total simulated population (29350) of each of the 7 age 
groups is shown.Page 9 of 10
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maintained for a relatively long period. Our results also
confirm the importance of rapid, decisive and robust
action if social distancing interventions are to be useful in
pandemic control. While such draconian measures seem
unlikely to be mandated given their impact on personal
freedom, they appear to have a key role to play in delaying
the development of a "worst case" influenza epidemic (i.e.
with a reproductive value of 3.5). They may be critical in
holding back an epidemic until vaccines are deployed on
a sufficient scale that subsequent relaxation of these rigor-
ous measures will not result in a consequential accelera-
tion in the scale of the outbreak.
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